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Abstract 
 
Current security systems are designed to prevent foreseeable attacks. Those security 
systems do not prevent effectively the more emergent types of attacks, like a botnet, whose 
presence and behavior is difficult to predict. In order to predominate those types of 
attacks, we advocate an adaptive security approach based on the animal immune system. 
But since those sophisticated attacks can also be directed at the security systems 
themselves, leading to computer immunodeficiency, like HIV, in this paper we propose a 
protocol that protects the immune system itself. This approach discriminates between 
attacks on the security systems, which are part of the computer immune system, and 
attacks on other vital computer systems in an information infrastructure.  
 
Keywords: Self-organization, complex adaptive systems, information security, immune 
system. 
 
 
1 Introduction 
In large-scale information systems complexity is more and more challenging security 
policies. Not only are those systems large, but also distributed and interwoven. Besides 
that they are also rapidly changing and have thus a dynamic structure due to 
organizational and technological factors. As such changes in one infrastructure may have 
effect on the other infrastructures. It is even so that initially small flaws in one 
infrastructure could result in amplified problems in other dependent infrastructures 
(butterfly effect) and bounce back. The consequence is that complexity increases, 
manageability decreases and vulnerability of such interwoven infrastructures increases. 
Those large conglomerates of infrastructures are sometimes that complex that their total 
reaction to certain local distortions becomes even unpredictable (Amin 2000). This is a 
growing concern, since societies depend in business and in private occasions more than 
ever on those conglomerate information systems, i.e. information infrastructures. 
Information infrastructures that provide critical services to physical critical 
infrastructures, like roads and electricity, are referred to as critical information 
infrastructures (CII).  
 
A CII could be an extranet of a bank, a WAN of a multinational, traffic control 
information systems or even (a part of) the Internet. The term critical infrastructure is 
here used to identify a chain of (sub)systems, the failure of which might cause high direct 
and/or indirect social, economical or ecological damage. A CII consists of many 
(sub)systems, or computing entities (CE’s), with different functions. The role of a 
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security CE’s in CII is crucial since all the security services that make the rest of the 
infrastructure dependable, arise in these nodes. We will call those security CE’s that 
contribute to providing one or more of the security services, i.e. identification, 
authentication, confidentiality, integrity and non-repudiation, security distribution centers 
(SDC’s).  
Current SDC’s, like virus scanners, intrusion detection systems, authentication servers 
and firewalls, are designed to repel foreseeable, i.e. “known” and “definable” attacks. 
Known means that its defense strategy is based on ex-post data and historically 
determined anomalies. Definable means that attacks are determinable in time (when?) 
and number (how many?). Current SDC’s in such CII do not meet in time the required 
adjustments to unforeseen  and emergent security attacks. Acknowledging this 
shortcoming, many organizations assure availability of their vulnerable ICT systems, and 
thus also their SDC’s, by employing redundancy techniques (Barbour et al 1989; 
Hiltunen et al 2003; Reiter 1994; Veríssimo et al 2000;Gong 1993). Those measures are a 
posteriori and do not prevent attacks. 
 
Because those traditional approaches are not designed to repel those complex attacks, in 
this paper we want to explore unconventional and risky alternatives instead of building 
upon existing and convenient security architectures: emergent complex problems require 
adaptive solutions. Since biology is an inexhaustible source of inspiration for many 
researches in many disciplines that apply or deal with emergent behavior, our security 
approach is, like many others (Kephart 1995; Forrest et al 1997; Goel et al 2003), also 
based on the animal immune system (AIS). This work differs however from those works 
on at least two points. First, those other works exploit the AIS to protect other functional 
CE’s (cells) of the CII (body) than the SDC’s. Sophisticated emergent attacks directed at 
SDC’s of the AIS self, called HIV attacks, are not prevented. The in this paper proposed 
protocol does take them also into consideration. Second, those other works usually 
exploit the recognition technique of the AIS to develop better intrusion detection systems 
and as such can block more attacks effectively, but still not all attacks. Our protocol 
complements those AIS-based approaches, since it also takes care of the missed, and thus 
successfully penetrated, attacks. Conclusively, other works either do not focus on security 
systems (Amin 2000; George et al 2003; Kephart 1995; Forrest et al 1997; Goel et al 
2003) or do not clear effectively the missed attacks (Kephart 1995; Forrest et al 1997; 
Goel et al 2003) or are not adaptive (Barbour et al 1989; Hiltunen et al 2003; Reiter 
1994;Veríssimo et al 2000; Gong 1993). 
 
 
2 Complex adaptive systems 
 
Complexity in computer science can be defined as the level in difficulty in solving 
mathematically posed problems as measured by the time, number of steps or arithmetic 
operations, or memory space required. Understanding this complexity is not always 
possible as it goes beyond our mental capacities, so that solutions to control the 
conglomerate infrastructure seem rather unachievable. Consider the Internet: despite that 
the fact that it is the result of human effort, we are still not capable of understanding its 
behavior, not to mention to master it (Van Best 2005).  
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But complexity, as one of the culprits that increases vulnerability, has also a positive 
side effect. The many ‘dumb’ bees, for example, are able to architecture a most complex 
honeycomb with hexagonal cells. More complex life forms like the human body depict a 
conglomerate of many bio-compartments. Those biological systems in the human body 
contain countless cells with many differentiated tasks to maintain the numerous functions 
of the body, like self-healing of wounds, the AIS against pathological diseases and so on. 
Obviously, by letting a sample of specialized cells perform their specific and yet simple 
tasks they manage together an aggregated complex task. Although the result of this 
complex and intelligent behavior is not intended by each single cell and none of them 
might be aware of this meta- goal, yet it is the result of their collaboration. We consider 
therefore a complex adaptive system (CAS) as a collection of interdependent rule-
following agents with interactions resulting in system-wide patterns across the group. The 
richness and volume of these interactions allow a complex system as a whole to undergo 
spontaneous self-organization. Self-organization is the emergence of a patterned outcome 
that no individual had planned, i.e. emergent behavior of the system. A characteristic is 
that no agent needs to be aware of the existence of the total space. Each CE knows at 
most what kind of capabilities it has and how it can look for relevant information in the 
environment. Properties of a CAS are (Wilinsky et al 1999): emergent behavior, 
adaptation, specialization, dynamic change, decentralization, competition and 
cooperation. Our positive perception of complexity, in which complexity is rather 
exploited to solve problems, is supported by other groups like the Santa Fe Institute 
(Langton et al 1992; Dooley et al 1995; Dooley 1997). As such in the next sections we 
will discuss a case where the AIS serves as input for information security problems. 
 
 
3 An analogy from the animal immune system 
 
Given the more sophisticated type of attacks within the increased complexity of 
infrastructures we foresee more opportunities in using complexity by means of a CAS to 
oppose security threats. We expect that especially in the field of computer security we 
can learn from the self-healing property of the human body to deal with many complex 
security problems in distributed systems. Particularly, the AIS will be considered to 
inspire us towards solutions as the main function of the AIS is to withstand foreign 
micro-organisms and to counter attack those who managed to penetrate the body. 
 
The animal immune response system 
Acknowledging that the body of vertebrates is immensely complex and the fact that it is 
capable of controlling this complexity autonomously is something we can learn from to 
master our problems. Given the motivation of one cell to survive (Dawkins 1989) and the 
aimed behavior of an SDC, also to survive, we see reasons to learn from the AIS.  
The body of vertebrates consists of a conglomerate of many bio-compartments. Those 
biological systems in the body contain countless cells with many differentiated tasks to 
maintain the numerous functions of the body, like self-healing of wounds, the AIS 
against pathological diseases and so on. By letting a sample of specialized cells to 
perform their specific and yet simple tasks they manage together an aggregated complex 
task. Although the outcome of this complex and intelligent behavior is not aimed by each 
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single cell and none of them might be aware of this meta- goal, yet it is the aggregated 
result of their collaboration. The analogy would be that clustered computers clear failures 
like the AIS is doing with antigens by seamless collaboration. In this section we aim at 
finding ideas and requirements for achieving the research goal to build a security defense 
system.  
 
The AIS is a complex network of closely cooperating cells and molecules, performing 
their functions with other organ systems. Its primary task is the induction and regulation 
of immunity to pathogens, such as bacteria, viruses and other micro-organisms, and to 
tumors (Roitt et al 2001). Host defences include both physiologic barriers and 
immunological responses. Skin and mucous membranes provide the first line of defence. 
Immune defences consist of innate and adaptive response system. The mechanism for the 
innate immunity is always present and comes rapidly into action. It provides a coarse-
grained defence system that usually does not hold for a long time. Because of its general 
recognition system many pathogens are able to pass by this weak access control. The 
adaptive immunity system in contrast is capable of recognizing many specific pathogens 
and forms as such a fine-grained access control. Besides that, it is capable of building 
new antibody cells against new pathogens, although this process costs time. While both 
responses are not mutually exclusive, they provide distinctly different advantages for 
dealing with pathogenic organisms. As a description of the specific working of the 
overall AIS would surpass the goal of this section we will limit us to one specific type of 
collaboration between some specific cells (among others from (Perham 2000; Roitt et al 
2001). 
Many types of white blood cells, like the small T- and B-cells (lymphocytes), 
originated in the bone marrow, play during their maturation in the body an important 
role in dismantling the pathogens. After recognition of the antigens the B-cells are 
cloned and dispatched through the lymphatic system to inform and to mobilize other 
lymphocytes. As such the lymphatic system facilitates the communication service by 
recirculating the lymphocytes and antibodies through the body. In the meanwhile 
other cloned B-cells bind to the antigens to mark them and a few of them do nothing 
as they function as memory cells for immediate recognition in future invasions. The 
killer (or cytotoxic) T-cells trace those marked pathogens, perforate infected cells and 
kill the body’s own cells that have been evaded by activating programmed cell death. 
Ultimately, the phagocytic cells, like macrophage and neutrophil, trace the remaining 
marked micro-organisms. After opsonization (coating) or neutralization they are 
absorbed and destroyed.  
 
The seamless and dependent collaboration between the different cells appears in many 
phases, like for example between the T- and B-cells. Through a process of cloning, 
specific B-cells are stimulated to proliferate and differentiate to bind the antigens. 
Although B cells are able to recognize antigen, they are unable to proliferate and 
differentiate unless triggered by the action of T-cells.  
In order for the T-cells to become stimulated to release lymphokines, they must also 
recognize specific antigens. However, while T-cells recognize antigen via their T-cell 
receptors (T-helper cells CD4+), they can only do so in the context of the antigen-
presenting cells (APCs). Several types of cells may serve the APC function, like the 
The Tenth Pacific Asia Conference on Information Systems (PACIS 2006) 
 
 304
macrophage and dendritic cells, but also the B-cell self. When APC bind antigen, the 
antigen becomes internalized, processed and expressed on the surface of the APC. 
This specific expression is now recognized by T-helper cells so that they can release a 
trigger for the B-cells.  
 
There two main types of T-cells: the helper T-cell and the killer cytotoxic T-cell. There 
two main types of T-helper cells: those that help the B-cells (Th2) and those that help the 
cytotoxic T-cells (Th1). The effect of HIV on the immune system is the result of 
gradually eliminating the Th1 and Th2 helper T-cells. The immune system gradually 
looses its functionality until it is malicious and/or malfunctioning. 
 
 
The application 
The body consists of many organ systems to keep the body healthy. Think of the straining 
function of toxic substances by the liver or the skin and mucous membranes that provide 
the first line of defense against pathogens. Above this, the immune response system 
provides the innate and adaptive response system. The T- and B- cells are analogously 
the SDC’s in CII. Similar to the elimination of the Th1 and Th2 helper T-cell sub-
populations by the HIV in a body, in CII the SCD’s can be eliminated by malware with 
emergent behavior (HIV attacks). 
 
Focusing on the last one, the immune response system is apparently also specific, 
adaptive and has a memory for protecting and healing the body. From the previous we 
can derive some ideas about realizing the aimed defense system as a CAS. The immune 
response system depicts most of all a sophisticated way of self-organization by 
collaborating individual cells. Requirements for achieving this self-organization principle 
can be derived from the working of the cells in the AIS. The cells  
- have specific internal motivators to act, that can be triggered by external events, 
- are selfish (Dawkins 1989), 
- are not necessarily aware of the consequence of their behavior, 
- have limited knowledge of other cells, 
- perceive other cells either as correct or compromised, 
- are able to find and communicate with helper cells, 
- are able to detect and isolate intruders and defect cells, 
- can be increased in number by cloning, 
- are able to distinguish between common and rare invasions, 
- can rely on a collective memory about intruders. 
 
Considering this adaptive, specialized, decentralized and cooperative behavior of cells, 
we claim that: attributing SDC’s with the similar characteristics as the animal immune 
cells will enable them together to build innate and adaptive immunity such that HIV 
attacks can resisted. 
 
 
4 Overview of the approach 
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In this section the so-called ‘escapability’ behavior of an endangered SDC will be 
introduced. We will draw an impression of how a distributed defense system, as a result 
of the collaboration of the individual nodes, should deal with infected SDC’s. In this 
approach the adaptive system takes also care of HIV attacks. 
 
The body  
Assume a space in which dozens of entities want to collaborate with each other 
(universities, naval, etc), but are unknown and thus by default initially do not trust each 
other. That means that they are logically tied to each other in a kind of grid, but due to the 
prisoners dilemma they do not act. A lot of effort is put therefore to establish a trust 
centre and to point out one of the members as a trusted point of reference to mediate 
security services (authentication/ key server), i.e. SDC. The essential requirement is that 
all the other members agree on and authorize this particular member. Once this is done all 
the members can rely on the trust centre for confirming identities and distributing keys. 
When this trust centre collapses or starts malfunctioning this would be disastrous for the 
whole group. The establishment of a new trust centre would be inevitable when the trust 
centre cannot be recovered properly or/and on time. Establishing a trust centre between 
unknown entities is one of the most difficult and costly things in the security domain, as 
it requires not only technical means but also social and sometimes political means 
(agreements, treaties). Therefore, a once established trust service should ideally be 
carried on without any process disjunction, regardless the vitality of the hosting trust 
base. 
 
 
The innate response system 
Assume now that there are two SDC’s in that space that issue trust (i.e. certificates or 
keys), like Kerberos does (Neuman 1994). An SDC knows only one operation mode: 
common session security mode. In the common session mode, an SDC reacts as a leader 
of clients immediately on known requests from clients and known security attacks from 
outside by common security measures (firewalls, IDS, etc). Each SDC takes care of the 
distribution of keys within its own group. If an object wants to communicate with another 
object, the SDC mediates trust by distributing keys. In figure 1 two groups are depicted, 
lead by SDC1 and SDC2. In fig a object (x,y) = (2,3) can start therefore communication 
with object (3,2) or with an object from another group like (3,3). In the latter one it is 
required that both SDC’s have a trust relationship. In figure b a situation is depicted in 
which trust center (2,2) has formed a new group after a leaving member (2,3) and new 
joining members ((1,3);(2,4)). However, when a trust center like (4,3) collapses due to 
unknown and unexpected failures then all the group members become useless orphans (at 
least for a certain crucial moment) as they are not trusted and secured. Only CE (x,y) = 
(3,2) remains secure and trusted due to his subscription to a second SDC, i.e. SDC1. Any 
requests for interaction will be rejected, since there is no trust center to verify their 
identity and to check permissions. This is depicted in figure c. 
 
 
 
The three figures depict how a conventional SDC’s react on a) common client requests b) 
client group behaviour and c) SDC failures. In the latter, most clients become orphans. 
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Figure 1. Conventional SDC’s 
 
The adaptive response system 
Assume now that an SDC distinguishes two operation modes: common session security 
mode and the survivability mode. In the survivability mode, the SDC serves clients but 
participates also in a resource sharing pool. As such it reacts to unknown failures 
(internally or from outside) also immediately, but now by using superfluous capacity of 
one of the other CE’s in this trust pool. Assume now that SDC1 has formed a pool with 
SDC2 and CE(3,3); see Figure 2. According to the metempsychosis principle the trust 
authority must not bind permanently to any hardware architecture so that the SDC can 
continue his tasks on another pool member. This mechanism should subsequently take 
care of consolidating the state of trust, packaging and launching the trust package. This 
trust package is the trust token that should contain the essential unique secret 
characteristics. In figure 2b the trust authority at (4,3) escapes to one of its neighbors 
(3,3) and recovers (reincarnates) there, like is explained for object volatility, so that the 
group of clients remains undisturbed after all. By doing so, this mechanism takes care of 
the reliability and availability of the trust service. The interesting thing is that with this 
approach trust remains during the security session centralized, but on attack it distributes 
and benefits from a decentralized approach as it can practically hop to any collaborating 
peer.  
It is obvious that the larger the network and thus the more collaborating CE’s there are, 
the metempsychosis principle and the principle of self-organization can provide perpetual 
availability of security services by continuously hopping away and reincarnation. Besides 
that in this mode the SDC escapes it builds internally also resistance by learning from the 
failure or type of attack. As for example, in a simple form a virus detection system is 
updated with the new type of virus. The corrupted SDC is isolated by the other SDC’s. 
They avoid any relation further with the corrupted SDC and multicast to the clients his 
state of corruption. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The figures show how SDC’s, should react on failures, so that all clients remain served. 
Collapsing SDC2 can continue his service by moving to one of his clients or to another SDC.  
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Figure 2. Escaping SDC’s  
 
5 Definition of security as a CAS  
 In order to characterize a SDC as a CAS we need to define the assumptions and the 
instruction set of each agent. In this case we choose a key distribution centre (KDC) as 
the SDC, although others are instances possible. 
 
Assumptions:  
- A CE is an agent. 
- An agent is either a client agent (Ac) or a KDC agent (Akdc). 
- A Akdc can deliver key distribution services to Ac’s.  
- An agent sees a limited set of other agents in the total space. 
- An Akdc shares with two ore more other Akdc’s a trust relationship. 
- An agent is not aware of the consequences of his actions for the overall system. 
- An agent perceives only availability and trustworthiness of other agents. 
- An agent has a memory system, i.e. it can store basic information about other agents. 
- An agent is able to send and receive messages. 
- An agent is either triggered by an explicit message or by a faulty expected message from other 
agents. 
- An external certification authority (CA) is ad hoc present (possibly also as a result of previous 
case). 
- The Akdc have signed certificates to verify their asymmetric key pair and their 
trustworthiness4.  
- Each Akdc is frequently suffering from denial of service attacks, but not all at the same time. 
 
Instruction set  
Three instruction sets keep the organism healthy: the innate, the adaptive and the 
common response system. The three instruction sets are called Medusa. The innate refers 
in our information infrastructures to the front end security systems, like intrusion 
detection and firewalls. The common security system refers to the service of the regarded 
SDC, i.e. a KDC. Both, front end security systems and KDC, will not be discussed 
further, since they are exiting technologies. The instruction set for the adaptive response 
systems, however, is not existing and will be given in the following instruction set. The 
next autonomous actions for each agent separately in the CAS enable the SDC service to 
be resilient by continuously hopping away from the attacked Akdc.  
0. Most Ac’s: subscribe by sending a secret s to one of the  Akdc’s (using his public key) 
based on his trustworthiness. 
2. Akdc: creates and sends on request symmetric keys to Ac’s.  
3. Akdc: frequently creates tokens t of those secrets s 5.  
4. Akdc: frequently sends t and a list of his preferred successors (SL) to those successor 
Akdc’s (SAkdc’s). 
5. SAkdc’s: check availability of suffering Akdc.  
    While an Akdc is DOS attacked do:  
  6. Successor Akdc’s: send declaration of death of harmed Akdc to each other.   
      If majority agrees on death:  
                                                 
4 In the so-called extension block of the certificate (X.509 vs.3 or SPKI format). 
5 Token = share, according to Shamir’s secret sharing algorithm 
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      7. SAkdc’s: send their t to first ranked SAkdc on SL. 
      8. SAkdc: reconstructs the secrets of the clients. 
      9. SAkdc: refreshes and sends the new secrets to the clients. 
10. Go to 2 with Akdc = SAkdc. 
 
This instruction set takes care of continuously replicating the security service and letting 
it resurrect on another host Akdc after a DOS attack. The new host Akdc functions as a 
temporary carriage, i.e. execution platform, until he is also attacked. This mechanism lets 
the security service to be independent of the resources of a particular Akdc. The clients 
are not necessarily aware of this host transition, since the trust relationship is based on the 
shared secret s and not on the identity of the Akdc. A detailed description of an applied 
instruction set can be found in (Daskapan 2006). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3. Continuous hopping away security services 
 
6 Test  
Preliminary tests have been conducted using also here a discrete event simulator NS+ 
with C++/TCL on Linux (Fall et al 2000). The aim is to see if resilience of front-end 
SDC’s by applying CAS approach of participating SDC’s is improved.  
 
The test 
The tests were performed up to 100 nodes of a CII in a WAN topology. In our test model 
we assume an existing botnet that tries to jeopardize our CII. The SDC’s in the CII were 
exposed to multiple distributed denial of service attacks (DDOS) from the botnet to cause 
system failures. The particular type of DDOS attack used for this scenario was the buffer 
overflow DDOS (Chang 2002). In the simulation model we assume that the SDC is a key 
distribution centre where the leader has a buffer for session key requests. This buffer will 
be exploited in this scenario. Normally, the leader will process requests faster than it 
receives but for this scenario, clients are instructed to send requests at a much faster rate 
so that the leader inevitably will collapse. To test survivability multiple consecutive 
DDOS attacks were planned.  
 
The result 
The test was first run with 6 participating SDC’s. Each SDC had a relation with two other 
SDC’s, such that all the SDC’s were directly or indirectly connected. DDOS attacks were 
executed then at any first one and subsequently at his successor and so on. Medusa was in 
this case able to resurrect the security service three times. The reason for that is that a 
majority of SDC’s must remain honest to clear the embedded voting algorithms reliably. 
We have conducted this test with larger numbers. It appears that when we increase the 
number of participating SDC’s also the number of attacks it can resist increases.  
Akdc 1 
Akdc 2 
Akdc N 
Hop 2
Hop 3Hop 1 
KDC 
resources 
tokens
DOS attack
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Many other tests were also carried out with different types of networks and different 
levels of trustworthiness of the agents. Also the simulation model was validated and 
security of the protocol was verified. Those detailed tests are out of the scope of this 
paper, but can be found in (Wiechers et al 2004; Wiechers et al 2005). 
 
7 Conclusions and future work 
In this paper we have derived ideas from the animal immune system to build an adaptive 
security defense system. This defense system discriminates between attacks on the 
security systems, which are part of the computer immune system, and attacks on other 
vital computer systems in an information infrastructure. The preliminary tests depicted 
that the claim of the defence system to be adaptive and to resist multiple attacks, even on 
the security systems self, can be met. In our future work we intend to apply more 
concepts from biological systems and to improve this initial protocol.  
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